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• A well-functioning payments system
is fundamental to the soundness of
the ﬁnancial system and the broader
economy.
• The Bank of Canada has a strong interest
in the safe and efﬁcient operation of
Canadian clearing and settlement
systems and formally oversees those
systems that are judged to have the
potential to pose systemic risk.
• As well, the Bank maintains a rigorous
research agenda with a view to
informing payments system policy
and oversight, both domestically and
in international forums.
• This article summarizes some recent
research conducted at the Bank of
Canada regarding the Large Value
Transfer System (LVTS), the core
payments system in Canada.
* The authors thank Jason Allen, James Chapman, Allan Crawford, Pierre
Duguay, Clyde Goodlet, Dinah Maclean, Sean O’Connor, and Michael
Hoganson (of the Canadian Payments Association) for helpful comments.
very day, individual Canadians, businesses,
and governments use various payment
instruments to purchase goods and services
and to make financial investments. These
instruments include cash, cheques, debit and credit
cards, e-money, and large-value electronic payment
orders. All of these payment instruments, except cash,
involve a claim on a ﬁnancial institution that provides
transferable deposit services, such as a bank, credit
union, or caisse populaire. For all of these transactions
to be completed, ﬁnancial institutions need a reliable
way to transfer funds between each other. That function
is provided by a payments system, which is the set
of instruments, rules, and technologies that facilitate
the clearing and settlement of funds transfers among
system participants.1
The Bank of Canada and the
Payments System
The Bank of Canada has a strong interest in the safe
and efﬁcient operation of major clearing and settle-
ment systems, for several reasons. For example, the
system used to settle large-value payments among
ﬁnancial institutions, the Large Value Transfer System
(LVTS), also provides the setting in which the Bank
conducts monetary policy.2 In addition, since clearing
and settlement systems underpin virtually all of the
transactions undertaken in the economy, their safe
and efﬁcient operation is important to the sound func-
1.  Clearing is the daily process by which system participants exchange pay-
ment orders and related items, and the net amounts owed to each participant
are determined. Settlement is the process by which participants fulﬁll their
net ﬁnancial obligations to one another, which involves the transfer of funds.
2.  For a discussion of the implementation of monetary policy in Canada, see
Howard (1998).
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tioning of the economy. Disruptions in major systems
can have serious implications for participants that can
extend to the financial system and to the economy
more generally. For these reasons, the Bank of Canada
oversees those systems that are judged to have the
potential to generate systemic risk.3 (Box 1 provides
an overview of the Bank of Canada’s approach to the
oversight of major clearing and settlement systems.)
Research on clearing and settlement issues informs
policy development and oversight and supports the
Bank’s work in multilateral forums, such as the Bank
for International Settlements’ Committee on Payment
and Settlement Systems. This forum brings together
major central banks to consider payments systems
3.  Systemic risk is the risk that the failure of one system participant to meet
its obligations will lead to the failure of another participant to meet its obliga-
tions, and so on, with broader adverse effects for the economy.
issues of mutual interest. A well-founded and rigorous
research program is also important for the Bank to
attract, retain, and develop staff.
Thisarticleprovidesanoverviewofsomeoftheresearch
conducted at the Bank of Canada on the payments
system, with particular attention to work on the LVTS,
which is a central component of the Canadian ﬁnan-
cial system. The work discussed here deals with both
the risk and efﬁciency of the LVTS, and taken together,
paints a picture of a payments system that is both safe
and efﬁcient.
The LVTS, Certainty of Settlement,
and Loss Allocation
TheLVTS,whichisthecorepaymentssysteminCanada,
is a real-time electronic system for processing large-
value or time-sensitive payments and is subject to
Box 1: The Bank of Canada’s Oversight Strategy
In the conduct of its oversight of systemically
important clearing and settlement systems, the
Bank of Canada focuses on several key principles to
frame its oversight strategy and to guide the conduct
of its oversight activities.
• The Bank judges whether a designated
clearing and settlement system meets its
minimum standards, but it does not
specify or decide how a system should
meet these standards. System owners
and operators determine how to meet
the Bank’s standards, which leads to effi-
cient solutions.
• The Bank promotes a co-operative
approach for voluntary action by a
designated system to meet its concerns.
• The Bank stresses transparency. The
Bank aims to develop policies that are
wellfounded,clear,andpubliclyavailable.
Essentially, the Bank of Canada’s oversight strategy
is to establish minimum standards that condition
the behaviour of designated systems to control
systemic risk. Private sector system operators, in
turn, ﬁnd the most efﬁcient way of meeting these
constraints. In addition, as a system evolves, Bank
staff review the design and rule changes proposed
by system operators to satisfy themselves that
systemic risk continues to be well controlled. The
Bank also periodically conﬁrms that systems are
operating as expected to mitigate systemic risk, for
example, through audits.
The private sector’s central role in designing and
operating systems, subject to minimum standards
established by the Bank of Canada, is important
for achieving both safe and efﬁcient systems. For
example, significant private sector involvement
is an important reason why Canada’s large-value
payments system (the LVTS) is based on the netting
of payment orders, as opposed to real-time gross-
settlement (RTGS) principles.1 More generally, the
Bank’s approach to oversight provides incentives
for the safe and efficient operation and evolution
of systemically important clearing and settlement
systems.
For more on the Bank of Canada’s role in the over-
sight of major clearing and settlement systems, see
Engert and Maclean (2006).
1.  RTGS refers to the continuous (real-time) settlement of funds or
securities transfers individually, on an order-by-order basis. Netting
refers to the process whereby individual obligations among system
participants are offset against one another (over a day, for example)
to produce a single net payable or receivable balance for each participant.
This considerably reduces the number and value of obligations to be
settled, which, in turn, can reduce risks and costs. However, netting
systems are more complex analytically and from a legal perspective,
than RTGS-based systems. For more on netting, see Engert (1992, 1993).33 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2007
oversight by the Bank of Canada.4 This system is used
by participating financial institutions to discharge
payment obligations on their own account and on
behalf of their customers. Owned and operated by the
Canadian Payments Association (CPA), the LVTS began
operations in February 1999. It is used to settle about
20,000 payments each day, with a total daily value
of $160 billion. Some of these payments are time-
sensitive, because the LVTS is used to settle funds
transfers from other important clearing and settlement
systems, such as those for securities transactions
and also for the Canadian-dollar leg of foreign
exchange transactions.
In the LVTS, electronic payment messages are processed
during the day in real time, while settlement of partic-
ipants’ corresponding obligations to the system
occurs on a multilateral net basis at the end of the day.
Payments processed by the LVTS are final, so that
recipients of payments can use these funds immediately
upon receipt without any risk of the payment being
reversed later. The LVTS contains two payment streams,
Tranche 1 and Tranche 2, which have different charac-
teristics and risk controls. Participants can use either
stream to send payments through the system, subject
to each stream’s risk controls.
In Tranche 1, a participant cannot incur an overall net
debit (payable) position that exceeds its Tranche 1 Net
Debit Cap (T1NDC) when sending payments through
the system. A participant’s T1NDC is determined by
the amount of eligible collateral that it has pledged in
the system for this purpose. In this way, participants
collateralize their own obligations, and Tranche 1 is
therefore referred to as a “defaulter-pays” payment
stream.
In Tranche 2, bilateral credit limits and multilateral net
debit caps are used to limit risk. A bilateral credit limit
(BCL) constrains exposures between any pair of system
participants. Speciﬁcally, each participant in the LVTS
can provide a BCL to any other participant, and this
limit determines the maximum payment obligation
that the recipient of a BCL can owe to the provider
of the BCL. In addition, a “multilateral cap” limits
exposures that each participant can present to the
system as a whole. A participant’s multilateral cap,
called its Tranche 2 Net Debit Cap (T2NDC), is calcu-
lated as the sum of all the BCLs it has received, multi-
4.  While the average value of payments processed by the LVTS is $8.5 mil-
lion, participants can submit payments of any size to the system, including
small-value payments.
plied by a ﬁxed proportion (called the “system-wide
parameter”), which is currently equal to 0.24.5
In Tranche 2, a collateral pool also helps to manage
risk and facilitate settlement of the LVTS in the event
of a participant default. Each participant must pledge
collateral to the system equal to the largest BCL that
it has provided to any other participant, multiplied
by the same system-wide parameter, 0.24. Since the
collateral pool is funded by all participants, and losses
from default are allocated to participants, Tranche 2 is
referred to as a “survivors-pay” payment stream.
Early payments system research at
the Bank of Canada showed that the
LVTS design would meet
international standards for risk
control.
An early example of payments system research at the
Bank of Canada is Engert (1993), which explored the
robustness of these risk-control mechanisms when the
LVTSwasunderdevelopment.Thisworkshowedthat
total Tranche 2 collateral would always be at least as
large as the single largest possible net debit (payable)
position in the system. As a result, in the event of the
default of any single participant, the system would
be able to settle, which is the internationally accepted
standard for risk control in such systems (Goodlet
2001).6 As well, this work demonstrated that each
participant would individually pledge sufficient
collateral in Tranche 2 to cover the largest possible loss
it would sustain in the event of any single participant
failure. In effect, participants prepay their potential
losses, which are proportional to the BCLs that they
have provided to other participants. In turn, this provides
5.  The value of 0.24 for the system-wide parameter is determined by the
effectiveness of the netting in the system. That is, the multilateral netting of a
given set of bilateral transactions leads to a multilaterally netted balance that
is a fraction of the underlying bilateral positions; the system-wide parameter
corresponds to this fraction. For more on the rudiments of netting, see Engert
(1992, 1993).
6.  In the extremely unlikely event of several participants defaulting on their
LVTS settlement obligations on the same day, it is possible that such defaulted
obligations could exceed available LVTS collateral. In this case, the Bank of
Canada would advance funds on the security of the available collateral to
guarantee settlement of the system and could become an unsecured creditor
of the defaulting institutions. This provision is part of the Bank of Canada’s
lender-of-last-resort policy; see Daniel, Engert, and Maclean (2004–2005).34 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2007
surviving participant in the event of a failure was
uncertain. This is essentially an empirical matter,
depending on the behaviour of system participants.
Put differently, while LVTS rules ensure that the system
is robust to defaults, the system’s rules do not ensure
that individual participants are robust to defaults.
To assess this empirical question, two recent papers,
McVanel (2005) and Ball and Engert (forthcoming),
consider actual daily LVTS payment data (courtesy
of the CPA) to measure potential losses to participants.
Specifically, these papers analyze unanticipated defaults
intheLVTSusingapaymentssystemsimulator(Box2).
The defaults are simulated in the following manner:
Each LVTS participant’s net payment positions (Tranche 1
plus Tranche 2) throughout each day of the sample
period are determined. From these positions, each
participant’s largest daily net debit (payable) position
is identiﬁed, and considered to be a default. Each such
defaultpositionisthencomparedwiththeparticipant’s
collateral available to offset the default. If collateral is
incentives to participants to manage their exposures
in the LVTS prudently, an issue considered in more
detail in the next section.
Taken together, these various elements provide for
“certainty of settlement,” whereby the LVTS is guar-
anteed to settle at the end of the day. Accordingly,
participants and their customers can (and do) treat
payment messages sent and received over the LVTS
as ﬁnal, thus reducing risk for participants and their
customers. These features also mitigate the potential
for the LVTS to pose systemic risk.
How Large Are Potential Losses in
the LVTS?
When the LVTS began operations in early 1999, it was
clear that the system would provide for certainty of
settlement and that loss-allocation rules would work
if necessary in the event of a default, as discussed
above. However, the size of the potential loss to each
Box 2: Simulation Analysis at the Bank of Canada
An important innovation in payments system
research has been simulation analysis. Simulation
models are useful tools because they can often be
calibrated to replicate a speciﬁc large-value pay-
ments system environment. These models can then
be used to assess the impact of changes in the struc-
tural arrangements and decision parameters of a
payments system without causing any costly dis-
ruption to the operation of the actual system. An
early example of this kind of work at the Bank of
Canada is Northcott (2002).
There is growing interest among central banks in
using simulation analysis to conduct research on
payments systems. As a contribution to this initia-
tive, the Bank of Finland has developed a general
simulation application, called BoF-PSS2, and is
offering this software to other central banks free
of charge. The BoF-PSS2 is currently being used
by over thirty central banks. The Bank of Canada has
recently adopted the BoF-PSS2 and has collaborated
with the Bank of Finland, the Bank of England, the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and MSG Inc.
(a Finnish software development company) to
reﬁne and improve the simulator. Indeed, the cur-
rent version of the simulator provides a reasonably
complete representation of the LVTS environment.
The BoF-PSS2 operates in a similar fashion to the
LVTS. Payments are submitted for processing
based on their time of entry. A submitted payment
is processed by the simulator provided that the
appropriate risk-control test is passed. Payments
that are not processed upon submission can be
temporarily stored in the simulator’s queue, or can
be rejected outright, depending on the user’s
preference. For queued payments, the BoF-PSS2
offers users a choice of various release algorithms
representing alternative queuing arrangements
typically available in large-value payments systems.
The BoF-PSS2 generates a variety of time-series
output data when a simulation is completed. These
data include statistics on the number and value
of processed and unprocessed payments. Data on
the use of credit limits, as well as the number and
value of queued transactions, can also be observed.
BoF-PSS2 users can choose the frequency at which
these output data are generated. For instance,
output statistics can be reported daily, as well as
on an intraday basis, in intervals ranging from one
to sixty minutes. Moreover, these output data are
available at the aggregate system level and also at
the individual participant level.35 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2007
not sufﬁcient to cover a net debit position, then a loss
is identified, which is allocated to other participants
following LVTS rules (in proportion to the BCLs extended
to the defaulter). In this way, a large number of defaults
and loss allocations are simulated. For example, Ball
and Engert (forthcoming) consider daily payment data
from April 2004 to April 2006 and simulate over 7,000
defaults and over 43,000 loss allocations.
Resultsfromthesetwopapers,whichconsiderdifferent
sample periods, are very similar.  Over the period from
April 2004 to April 2006, average simulated losses to
participants amount to only 0.4 per cent of regulatory
tier 1 capital, and the average of participants’ largest
simulated losses is only 7 per cent of their tier 1 capital
(Ball and Engert forthcoming). Two small participants
peak at relatively large losses of over 20 and 30 per
cent of tier 1 capital, respectively; while significant,
these values would not be solvency-threatening on
their own.
Ball and Engert also explore simulated losses to the
Bank of Canada. As a participant in the LVTS, the Bank
routinely extends a BCL to each participant equal to
5 per cent of the sum of all BCLs received by the
participant.7 In doing so, the Bank undertakes risk
related to loss allocations as well. Ball and Engert ﬁnd
that the average simulated loss to the Bank of Canada
is only $24.1 million, and the single largest loss is
$121.7 million. To put this into context, the Bank’s net
revenue in 2005 was $1.7 billion (Bank of Canada 2006).
Notwithstanding the small size of simulated losses,
the methodology followed in these papers generates
losses that are almost certainly larger than would
actually be experienced, as stressed in McVanel (2005).
There are several reasons for this. First, the simulated
losses are based on the largest possible (or peak) daily
exposures, given actual LVTS payments, and participant
failure is assumed to occur at the time of peak exposure
during LVTS operating hours. In practice, however,
regulators would probably try to close a failing insti-
tution after LVTS operating hours, if possible. Second,
defaults areassumed tobe unexpected (i.e.,surprises).
Therefore, participants do not take steps to reduce
potential losses by decreasing BCLs to potential
defaulters. Doing so would reduce a suspect partici-
7.  The Bank follows this mechanical rule to avoid giving rise to conﬂicts of
interest (real or apparent), in light of its access to conﬁdential prudential
information. The 5 per cent value has been in place since the LVTS began
operating in February 1999 and was based on an estimate of daily Govern-
ment of Canada payments sent to the Bank by LVTS participants. (The Bank
of Canada is the federal government’s banker.) The Bank can increase its BCL
to a participant as a contingency measure under exceptional circumstances;
this has never been done (Arjani and McVanel 2006.)
pant’s Tranche 2 Net Debit Cap, and hence its capacity
to generate losses. Similarly, the analysis assumes that
prudential supervisors do not take measures to mitigate
loss (notwithstanding the early-intervention regime
that characterizes the federal safety net).8 Finally, it is
assumed that surviving participants do not recover
any of their losses from the estate of the defaulter.
Consideration of these factors would lead to smaller
losses than those reported above.
Losses from a participant failure in
the LVTS are very likely to be small.
The risk controls of the system allow
and encourage participants to keep
their potential losses manageable.
Overall, then, these papers conclude that losses from
a participant failure in the LVTS are very likely to be
small and readily manageable. In the case of one or
two small participants, under worst-case assumptions,
losses could be significant, but not solvency-threatening
on their own. In sum, the risk controls of the LVTS
allow and encourage participants to keep their
potential losses manageable.
Is Collateral in the LVTS Excessive?
So far in this article, we have discussed how the design
of the LVTS provides for certainty of settlement and
loss allocation, and provides incentives that encourage
participants to manage their exposures prudently,
which, in turn, mitigates systemic risk. In this regard,
the evidence indicates that potential losses in the LVTS
are small. A central part of the LVTS risk-control mech-
anisms, as discussed above, is the use of high-quality
collateral to secure exposures. Early in the operation
of the LVTS, it appeared that participants pledged an
amount of collateral in the system that was in excess
of requirements. Accordingly, Bank researchers have
examined whether collateral use in the LVTS is efficient,
or if collateral pledged to the system is somehow
excessive.
LVTS payments sent and received by each participant
can vary significantly from day to day, hour to hour,
8.  For more on the prudential safety net in Canada, see Engert (2005).36 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2007
and even minute to minute.9 Participants know in
advance many of the payments they will receive and
be required to send. They cannot, however, always
synchronize these ﬂows. They may have to make large
payments before they receive incoming funds, some-
times unexpectedly. In such instances, when LVTS risk
controlslimitaparticipant’spayment-sendingcapacity,
a buffer of collateral in the system can support an
increase in the participant’s Tranche 1 Net Debit Cap,
which, in turn, would allow the participant to complete
the timely delivery of payments. As well, an LVTS
participant may occasionally require an unusually
large advance at the end of the day from the Bank of
Canada, perhaps because of an operational problem.10
A buffer of collateral can also serve to back any large
advances that may be required in such a situation.
In sum, if participants do not hold sufﬁcient collateral
for LVTS purposes, large-value, time-sensitive, or
systemically important payments could be delayed,
with attendant costs, including disruption of payments
systems and delays to clients of LVTS participants.
On the other hand, if an LVTS participant does not
minimize the costs associated with holding and man-
aging collateral, excessive costs could be passed on
to its clients, who could pay more for sending LVTS
payments than would be optimal. If they are system-
atically deterredfrom sending paymentsvia theLVTS,
clients may choose payments systems that are less
well protected against risk. It follows from this discus-
sion that the efﬁciency with which collateral is used in
the LVTS can have broader effects that extend beyond
the payments system.
To gain a better understanding of the efficiency of
collateral use in the LVTS, and the associated trade-offs,
McPhail and Vakos (2003) study whether participants
pledge cost-minimizing levels of collateral in the
system. As already discussed, there are two payment
streams in the LVTS, Tranche 1 and Tranche 2, and the
latter accounts for about 85 per cent of the payment
value sent over the LVTS. Tranche 2 uses collateral so
efficiently that only a few billion dollars of collat-
eral are needed to support about $140 billion per day
in payments. As well, since collateral requirements for
Tranche 2 payments change relatively little from one
day to the next, there is little need for participants to
hold a large buffer of collateral to accommodate changes
9.  For a discussion of intraday payment ﬂows in the LVTS, see Cheung
(2002).
10.  Such advances occur under the Bank of Canada’s standing liquidity facil-
ities; see Daniel, Engert, and Maclean (2004–2005).
in Tranche 2 collateral requirements. For these reasons,
McPhail and Vakos (2003) focus on Tranche 1 payment
ﬂows to assess the efﬁciency of collateral usage.
Tranche 1 payments currently account for about 15 per
cent of the value sent over the LVTS—about $20 billion
per day. Tranche 1 payments must be ﬁnanced, dollar
for dollar, by Tranche 1 funds already received or by
intraday credit, which must be fully secured by eligible
collateral. It is therefore much more expensive for
participantstosendTranche1payments thanTranche2
payments, and so Tranche 1 tends to be reserved for
situations in which insufficient credit is available for
a time-critical payment to pass through the Tranche 2
risk controls. To study collateral-use efﬁciency in the
LVTS, McPhail and Vakos consider data from February
1999 (when the system began operations) to May 2003.
Over this period, daily Tranche 1 payments sent by
ﬁnancial institutions averaged $6 billion.
The authors build a theoretical model that generates
the demand for collateral by LVTS participants under
the assumption that they minimize the cost of collateral
management. Their model predicts that the optimal
amountofcollateralpledgedbyeachLVTSparticipant
depends on the opportunity cost of collateral, the
transactions costs of acquiring assets eligible as collat-
eral and transferring them in and out of the LVTS, and
the distribution of a participant’s payment flows in
the LVTS.11 McPhail and Vakos use estimates for the
opportunity cost of collateral and transactions costs
to apply their model to LVTS participants. They ﬁnd
that their model of optimal collateral demand, which
is based on benchmark values for the various relevant
costs, explains the aggregate amount of collateral
pledged to the LVTS quite well, despite the fact that
these costs may vary among participants. Speciﬁcally,
the authors ﬁnd that when one LVTS participant with
an apparently lower opportunity cost of collateral is
excluded, aggregate actual collateral is within 5 per
cent of the level predicted by their model.
As expected, the opportunity cost of collateral is
particularly important in explaining the amount of
collateral pledged to the LVTS. Sensitivity analysis
of the model indicates that, as this cost of collateral
increases, the amount of collateral that participants
hold would be greatly reduced. The analysis also indi-
cates that, for about 90 per cent of the time, the level of
11.  The authors deﬁne the opportunity cost of collateral as the spread
between the rate of return on assets pledged as collateral and the rate of
return on assets likely to be held in the absence of collateral requirements in
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collateral demand predicted by the model is sufﬁcient
to cover daily Tranche 1 payment activity. That is, par-
ticipants would have to pledge additional collateral to
the LVTS to meet their Tranche 1 payment obligations
about 10 per cent of the time. McPhail and Vakos note
that this creates the possibility that time-sensitive or
systemically important payments could be delayed,
since participants must try, possibly on short notice, to
obtain and pledge additional collateral to meet unex-
pectedly large payments needs. These occasions would
be rare, however.
The evidence indicates that collateral
(liquidity) use in the LVTS is cost
efﬁcient.
The authors conclude that there does not appear to be
an excessive amount of collateral pledged in the LVTS.
On the contrary, the aggregate level of collateral in the
system corresponds well with the optimal cost-mini-
mizing behaviour indicated by their model.
What Is the Trade-Off between
Liquidity and Payment Delay?
The preceding section focused on the efficiency of
collateral use in the LVTS, with particular attention to
Tranche 1. This section discusses recent Bank of Canada
research on the nature of the trade-off between the
amount of liquidity in Tranche 2 (secured by collateral)
and the capacity of the system to process payments
expeditiously—which is captured by the notion of
“payment delay.”12 Also discussed are innovations
that might improve this trade-off by providing for
reduced liquidity and collateral requirements while
simultaneously improving payment-processing
capacity.
In the LVTS, as in other large-value payments systems,
intraday credit is an important source of the liquidity
thatparticipantsneedtoprocesspayments.Asdiscussed
above, participants routinely grant bilateral credit
lines to each other in Tranche 2, and pledge collat-
eral proportional to the largest BCL that they extend
as part of the risk controls. Of course, this is costly,
12.  Payment delay refers to the lag between the time of a participant’s sub-
mission of a payment to the LVTS for processing and the time when the pay-
ment is actually processed by the system with ﬁnality.
given that collateral in the LVTS consists of highly
liquid and marketable securities.
Smaller BCLs in Tranche 2 would reduce collateral
requirements (and related costs). However, this could
alsoleadtodelaysintheintradayprocessingofpayment
messages, since participants’ ability to send payments
would be constrained by tighter bilateral and multi-
lateral Tranche 2 risk controls. When a participant has
insufﬁcient intraday liquidity in Tranche 2, payments
are held and are not released for processing until the
participantsending thepayment messagehassufficient
liquidity to do so, or decides to send the payment
through the more expensive Tranche 1.
In turn, delays in processing payments raise other costs.
Forexample,aparticipantcouldbeexpectingtoreceive
payments by a certain time of day, such that any delay
in payment will lead to a shortfall in its intraday funds
position and, hence, to a possible shortfall in fulﬁlling
its obligations to its customers. The participant may
then have to incur additional liquidity costs to replace
these funds on short notice. It follows that a payment
delay created by one participant could spread to others
in the system. There might also be other system-wide
implications. For example, the prolonged or routine
delay of payments might increase potential losses
associated with other risks in the financial system,
such as operational or systemic risk.
To understand better the trade-off between liquidity
and payment delay in Tranche 2 of the LVTS, Arjani
(2006) simulates this relationship using three months
of data (July–September 2004) on daily Tranche 2 credit
limits and payments (courtesy of the CPA). The author
ﬁnds that, as intraday liquidity is decreased, payment
delay escalates at an increasing rate.13 That is, as shown
in Chart 1, this work estimates a convex relationship
between Tranche 2 liquidity (horizontal axis) and a
measureof paymentdelay (verticalaxis).The measure
of payment delay in Chart 1, the percentage value of
unsettled transactions, indicates the percentage of the
value of total payments submitted to the system that
remain unprocessed at the end of the day.
A simulated reduction in the system-wide parameter,
fromitscurrentvalueof0.24to0.18,increasesunsettled
daily payments by only a very small amount. At the
same time there is a corresponding reduction of the
collateral needed in the system, of about $750 million
13. The reduction in intraday liquidity is simulated by decreasing the system-
wide parameter (discussed above). This, in turn, directly reduces partici-
pants’ Tranche 2 net debit caps (T2NDCs) and thereby reduces their capacity
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per day on average, representing a savings of 25 per
cent of Tranche 2 collateral. As the amount of simu-
lated liquidity in the system declines further, however,
the percentage of unsettled payments rises sharply, as
shown in Chart 1.
Arjani (2006) also examines a potential improvement
in the trade-off between Tranche 2 liquidity and payment
delay. Specifically, the author examines how to achieve
a reduction in payment delay for any given amount
of intraday liquidity by making more intensive use of
“centralized queuing” in the LVTS; that is, restrictions
thatcurrentlyexistontheuseoftheLVTScentralqueue
are assumed to be relaxed. The LVTS has a complex
queuing algorithm that can offset batches of queued
(delayed) payments against one another (on a multi-
lateral basis) throughout the day. More intensive use
of such algorithms could lead to lower liquidity needs
and faster processing of payments. Under current LVTS
rules, however, participants are generally discouraged
from using the central queue.14 Instead of relying on
the central queue when payments are delayed, LVTS
participants currently hold their delayed payments in
their own internal queues.
14. There are good reasons for this. Perhaps most important is a concern that
increased use of the central queue could lead to increased credit risk for par-
ticipants from crediting clients’ accounts with expected incoming funds
before these payments are processed and received. Of course, that could hap-
pen only if participants were aware of all payments in the central queue that
were to be sent to them; that is, if queued payments were observable (as is the
case in the LVTS).
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Arjani simulates increased use of the LVTS queue by
assuming that Tranche 2 payments not passing the
risk controls become centrally queued, where, unlike
the case of internal queuing, all queued payments are
subject to multilateral offsetting at regular intervals.
The author finds that, under these conditions, payment
delay is reduced for each amount of intraday liquidity
considered. In addition, the relative beneﬁt of central
queuing (in terms of reduced payment delay) increases
as intraday liquidity is lowered. For example, with a
75 per cent reduction in system liquidity (a system-
wide parameter of 0.06), the simulations suggest that
it is still feasible to reduce the value of unsettled trans-
actions by 9 percentage points, or $10 billion, by making
more intensive use of the central queuing arrangement.
This also implies signiﬁcant collateral savings.
Research suggests that additional
improvements in the efﬁciency-risk
trade-off in the LVTS might be
possible.
Arjani(2006)stressesthattheseresultsarepreliminary
and suggests possible extensions. One would be to
examine the actual cost of payment delay, so that a
direct comparison could be made between this cost
and collateral savings resulting from a reduction in
the system-wide parameter, or from more intensive
use of the LVTS central queue. Another would be to
consider participants’ reactions to a change in the queu-
ing environment. In this regard, more intensive use of
central queuing is likely to alter participants’ behaviour
with respect to both payment submission and the
provision of bilateral credit lines. Such responses could
affect (possibly adversely) the net impact of the trade-
off between liquidity and payment delay. These exten-
sions, and others, are necessary before firm conclusions
canbedrawnregardingnetbenefitsfrommoreintensive
use of the queuing mechanisms in the LVTS.
Concluding Remarks
The research summarized in this article suggests that
the LVTS strikes an effective balance between safety
and efficiency, and that further improvements to this
balance may be possible. Engert (1993) demonstrates
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meets internationally accepted standards for risk
containment and supports the provision of intraday
payment ﬁnality. One aspect of the LVTS risk-control
mechanism is the use of a survivors-pay collateral pool
(and loss-allocation rules) to secure intraday credit
in Tranche 2. In this regard, the LVTS design may be
viewed as accepting risk of loss to stakeholders in the
event of a participant default in return for relatively
economical daily collateral (or liquidity) requirements.
A natural question is: How much risk is accepted to
achieve these savings? That is, how large are potential
losses to surviving participants, in the event of a default,
from this efﬁcient design? Using simulation analysis,
McVanel (2005), and Ball and Engert (forthcoming)
address this question by assessing the impact of an
unanticipated default in the LVTS under worst-case
conditions. These authors find that the risk of loss
faced by surviving participants generally appears to
be small and, in all cases, manageable.
McPhail and Vakos (2003) explore the efﬁciency of the
daily operation of the LVTS by studying whether the
amount of collateral pledged by participants for LVTS
purposes is efficient from a cost-minimization per-
spective. Focusing on Tranche 1, the authors ﬁnd that,
in general, their model of optimal collateral demand
ﬁts actual behaviour in the LVTS well, suggesting that
collateral use in the LVTS is efﬁcient.
Finally, Arjani (2006) employs simulation analysis to
examine a fundamental safety-efﬁciency trade-off—
between intraday liquidity and payment delay—in
Tranche 2 of the LVTS. Based on the current trade-off,
the author ﬁnds that substantial liquidity savings, in
terms of reduced daily Tranche 2 collateral require-
ments, could be realized with only a minor increase in
payment delay. That is, further efﬁciency gains might
be possible in Tranche 2 without signiﬁcantly compro-
mising risk control. This work also suggests that more
intensive use of the LVTS’s centralized queuing mech-
anism could lead to improvements in the trade-off
between payment delay and intraday liquidity, thus
further increasing the efﬁciency of the system.
While the focus of this article is on the LVTS, research
at the Bank of Canada on clearing and settlement sys-
temscertainlyextendsbeyondthatsystem.Forexample,
Northcott (2002) uses simulation analysis to assess the
potential for Canada’s Automated Clearing Settlement
System (a small-value payments system) to pose
systemic risk. This research was inﬂuential in the Bank
of Canada’s decision to not designate this system
under its formal oversight authority. Lai, Chande, and
O’Connor (2006) build a theoretical model to explore
competition and efﬁciency under particular organiza-
tional arrangements common to payments systems
around the world (known as “tiering”). McPhail (2003)
applies recent advances in the management of opera-
tional risk and related academic work to develop a
framework to assess and manage operational risk in
clearing and settlement systems. Insights from this
work have been applied to the Bank of Canada’s own
operationalrisk-managementframework.Mostrecently,
Chiu and Lai (forthcoming) provide a review of the
academic literature on payments-system modelling
to inform future research initiatives.
A key goal for longer-term research is
to improve the modelling of the
behaviour of the participants in the
payments system.
Looking ahead, a key longer-term goal for future
research on clearing and settlement systems is the
modelling of participant behaviour so that analysis
can explicitly and more rigorously take into account
changes in behaviour motivated by, for example, poten-
tial design innovations in clearing and settlement sys-
tems. Another focus at the Bank of Canada will be
continuing collaboration, since Bank staff intend to
deepen their relationships with researchers in other
organizations sharing these interests. A current example
of this is collaboration with staff of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York on the impact of participant opera-
tional problems on the functioning of large-value pay-
ments systems, including effects on system liquidity
and the ability to settle payments. Another example of
such collaboration is work with Bank of England staff
on fundamental issues concerning the design of large-
value payments systems.
The Bank of Canada’s research on payments systems
has yielded a variety of useful insights and applications.
At the same time, it has also stimulated additional
questions and new ideas, and the Bank’s research
efforts in this area are expected to continue for years to
come.40 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2007
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